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I
n his celebrated work, An EnquinJ Into Human Understanding, 
David Hume produces a persuasive skeptical argument 
against inductive reasoning based on experience. Coupled 
with Rene Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy, Hume's 
argument presents a grand challenge to modern epistemologists. 
Indeed, "challenge" accurately characterizes the true intent of 
Hume's seminal work. Hume does not claim to prove defini­
tively that inductive reasoning is not justified; rather, he demon­
strates the difficulty of making arguments for induction. Truly, 
Hume admits that it is "a man guilty of unpardonable arrogance 
who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own inves­
tigations, that therefore it does not really exist" (25). 
Bayesianism purports to be this argument that has es­
caped Hume's investigations. By showing that our beliefs are 
consistent only if they adhere to a probability calculus, Bayesian­
ism provides a justified model for induction based on experience. 
Unfortunately, when faced with Hume's exact skeptical chal­
lenge, the Bayesian model runs into some theoretical difficulties. 
What's more, the Humean skeptical challenge actually exploits 
some deeper problems with Bayesianism. In short, because 
Bayesianism acts like a process of elimination with respect to 
certain hypotheses, Bayesianism is inherently unqualified to 
model inductive reasoning of any sort. 
To begin, we will briefly sketch Hume's skeptical chal­
lenge. Next, we will look at the philosophical foundations of 
Bayesianism. Third, we will examine exactly how Bayesianism 
purports to justify inductive hypotheses - its successes and short­
comings. Finally, we will see exactly how the Humean challenge 
reveals the deeper problems of Bayesianism and how a Bayesian 
might respond to these problems. 
Hume's Skeptical Challenge 
Hume suggests that if a hypothesis is confirmed many times in 
one's experience, it does not necessitate that it will be true in the 
future. Upon the consistent confirmation of a hypothesis in one's 
experience, it is natural to assume that such a hypothesis will be 
confirmed in the future. Truly, this sort of inductive reasoning is 
crucial both for science and our day-to-day survival. Hume calls 
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into question this reasoning by showing that it rests on an 
unsupported assumption: the future resembles the past. Truly 
inductive reasoning often takes the following form: 
(1) I have found the hypothesis h to be true in all past 
instances. 
(2) The future resembles the past. 
(3) The hypothesis h will be true in the future. 
Such an inductive argument is valid but not sound because one 
cannot justify (2) without falling into a vicious circle. 
As such, there is a challenge implicit in Hume's skepti­
cism that is of interest to the Bayesian. Since Hume does not think 
we are justified in believing that the past resembles the future, 
clearly a justification of inductive reasoning must warrant our 
inductive conclusions without implicitly assuming that the fu­
ture resembles the past. As such, it is Hume's skeptical challenge 
to show that the hypothesis 
hlOo, that a statement S will always be true 
is more justified than the hypothesis 
hI' that the statement S is only true before time t. 
Accordingly, by shOWing that h100 is more justified then hf, we can 
justify inductive reasoning without necessarily assuming that the 
past resembles the future. 
The Philosophic Foundations of Bayesianism 
As a system of justification, Bayesianism attempts to justify the 
supporting connections between our beliefs by showing that 
these connections preserve consistency. The Bayesian uses an 
argument from probability and betting theory to show that our 
belief formation must follow certain rules to be consistent. Thus, 
we can justify the connections between our beliefs by showing 
that they follow the Bayesian rules and, thus, are consistent. Put 
simply, the Bayesian argument works as follows: 
(1) Our degrees of belief can map to subjective probabili­
ties. 
(2) Our subjective probabilities imply a system of odds. 
(3) Certain systems of odds are subject to a Dutch Book. 
(4) Odds subject to a Dutch Book are inconsistent. 
(5) Certain systems of beliefs are inconsistent by syllogism 
of 1-4. 
(6) If we form beliefs according to the axioms of probabil­
ity calculus, our system of beliefs will never be "Dutch 
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Book" inconsistent. 
(7) Thus, we can justify connections between beliefs by 
the theorems based on the axioms of the probability 
calculus. 
In all Bayesianism does not claim to address the regress argu­
ment and provide an ultimate foundation for belief; rather, it 
seeks to explain how we can justify the connections within a 
group of beliefs. 
Observe that our beliefs in certain propositions come in 
degrees of certainty that we can map to numbers-subjective 
probabilities. Certainly, we are more confident in some beliefs 
than others. For example, although I might be absolutely certain 
that there is a pen on the desk in front of me, I may be only 
somewhat confident that my date will be at lunch on time. 
Clearly, we naturally prescribe different levels of certainty to our 
beliefs. Intuitively, these degrees of. certainty can map onto an 
arbitrary range of numbers. As in the example above, my belief 
in the pen would map onto a number larger than my belief in my 
date's timeliness. For the Bayesian, certainty is a subjective proba­
hilittj the strength of which we measure by assigning a numerical 
value. One's subjective probability P in a belief h is expressed as 
the function P(ll). In all a subjective probability POt) is simply a 
measure of one's confidence in the hypothesis h. 
As such, we believe that It in the sense required for 
knowledge when our subjective probability that h is sufficiently 
high. To know that h, one must truly believe, truly be certain that 
h. Indeed, according to the "true, justified belief" theory of 
knowledge, I only know that h if I believe with some level of 
confidence in the truth of h, and h is in reality true. My level of 
confidence in a belief is measured by my subjective probability; 
thus, if my subjective probability in h is sufficiently high, I 
believe that h. Determining the exact threshold at which simple 
beliefs become true conviction of the sort necessary for knowl­
edge will not be essential for the Bayesian argument. Rather, it is 
enough to show that only a sufficiently high subjective probabil­
ity that h implies that one truly believes that h. 
To divert briefly from the topic, objective probabilities (as 
opposed to subjective probabilities) can describe "fair" betting 
odds. In betting, first the bookmaker offers betting odds p:b 
against a hypothesis It and puts the sum b into the pot. Next the 
punter, who has some level of confidence in h, puts a sum pinto 
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the pot. Now the truth-value of h is revealed: if h, then the punter 
receives the pot; if -h, the bookmaker receives the pot. In SUC? a 
scenario, given a certain real-world probability that h, the obJec­
tively fair odds are odds that comer no advantage or disadvan­
tage to the punter or bookmaker based on this probability. For 
example, if the probability that h is 1/6, then the fair odds against 
It are 1:5 because larger rewards make up for the relatively slim 
chances for the punter. In other words, if the bookmaker and 
punter were to continue betting on h at these odds infinitely, 
neither person would, on average, make any money. As such, 
given an objective probability P(h), we can always find the objec­
tively fair betting odds P(h):l-P(/t) such that neither person is at 
an advantage. 
Similarly, subjective probabilities can describe subjec­
tively fair betting odds. If I believe that h with a certain probabil­
ity P(It), then I should I be inclined to accept a wager at or above 
the "fair" betting odds for that probability. Certainly, financial 
considerations or personal aversion to gambling may prevent me 
from ever taking such a Ufair" bet; however, if I have this subjec­
tive probability, then I am at the very least deeply inclined to 
believe that such odds will comer no advantage to either side. 
Importantly, since these are subjectively fair betting odds, these 
odds may not in fact be fair, but are subjectively fair to the person 
who holds the subjective probability. In all, just like subjective 
probabilities numerically represent our comidence in a proposi­
tion, they similarly represent not so much an evaluation, but a 
deep feeling that tends to produce these odds. 
If our beliefs can be represented as subjective probabilities 
which, in turn, can be represented as betting odds, then our 
system of beliefs is equivalent to a system of betting odds. 
Indeed, there is an intuitive appeal that "to possess a degree of 
belief, P(h), in h is actually to be prepared to bet indifferently on 
or against h at odds P(h):l-P(h)" (Howson and Urbach, 91). In 
fact, we make bets like this all the time. For example, suppose I 
am driving home late at night. I have a certain level of confi­
dence that I will get home safely; in other words, I have some 
s~bjective probability that I will get home safely. This may be 
different from the actual probability that I will get home safely, 
but it certainly is the probability that influences my decisions. In 
considering whether I should speed, I clearly weigh the reward 
(getting home earlier) with the penalty (death on 101). Certainly, 
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the penalty outweighs the l'ewal'd, but I might still be inclined to 
speed if my subjective pmbability of getting home safely is 
sufficiently high. Thus, the rewards and penalties for speeding 
form a sort of odds that I choose to accept based on my confi­
dence in my driving ability. Intuitively, the connection between 
a system of betting odds and a system of belief is clear. But if 0UI' 
beliefs are analogous to a system of betting odds, what does this 
tell us abot the nature of 0UI' beliefs? 
We begin by looking at a method for judging the fairness 
of a system of betting odds - a method that involves the Dutch 
Book As explained above, we say the betting odds for a particu­
lar hypothesis are fair if they confer no advantage to either party. 
Similarly, we define a system of betting odds as fair if neither 
party can gain an advantage fmm exploiting this system. By 
convention, we say that any system that is ripe to be exploited in 
such a manner is subject to a "Dutch Book" Put simply, a Dutch 
Book is a system of stakes that, given some wagers, can ensure a 
net l6ss for the punter-regardless of the truth-values of the 
hypotheses. 
For example, if your fair odds for the mutually exclusive 
hypotheses (1, b, and (n ~i b) are 1:2. 1:2, and 1:1 respectively, then 
your system of betting odds is subject to a Dutch Book Given 
these odds, should the bookmaker ask for a bet of 2 for a, 2 for b, 
and 3 against (a ~) b) at these odds you will accept. However, 
given any possible truth-value for a and b, you will always have 
a net loss. We are led to conclude, even if the odds for each 
different hypothesis are fair, the system of odds as a whole 
cannot be fair. In other words, while the odds 1:2 for a and b may 
be fair, the odds 1:1 for (a v b) cannot be fair. Given this example, 
if our system of beliefs acts like a system of odds, then what does 
it mean if this system of beliefs is subject to a Dutch Book? 
Example of a Dutch Book against the betting odds a~1:2 b~1:2 and (a 
v b)~1:1 
Possibili- Your Bet Gain Loss 
ties 
a and-b 2 4 5 
-a and b 2 4 5 
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The Bayesian makes a strong case that a system of beliefs 
subject to a Dutch Book is incoherent or at least inconsistent. 
Using the previous example, the Bayesian argues that there is 
something inconsistent in believing Pea) = Pcb) = 1/3 and also 
believing Pea v b) = 1/2. Indeed, this argument has intuitive 
appeal. Suppose I am about 1/2 certain that David Hume had red 
hair, and 1/2 certain that he had brown hair. It seems, if my beliefs 
are consistent, that I should be quite certain that he had either red 
or brown hair. The Dutch Book, the Bayesian argues, tests for 
this sort of consistency in the connections between beliefs. Fur­
ther, according to Bayesianism, to be inconsistent is to be unjusti­
fiable. Inconsistent systems of beliefs are simply irrational. As 
such, the Bayesian looks for a way to create systems of beliefs 
that avoid the Dutch Book, and, thus, are justifiable and consis­
tent. 
If your beliefs adhere to four axioms of probability calcu­
lus, then your beliefs cannot be exploited like a Dutch Book and 
will always be consistent. Avoiding the inconsistency of Dutch 
Books puts a certain set of constraints on any set of betting odds. 
It follows that since our subjective betting odds map directly onto 
a set of subjective probabilities, our formation of subjective prob­
abilities is also constrained by the Dutch Book. According to the 
Bayesian, tl1ese constraints are expressed in foul' axioms of proba­
bility calculus. The Bayesian proves that if one does not obey the 
axioms in forming beliefs, then the resultant subjective betting 
odds will be subject to a Dutch Book In short, if your degrees of 
belief are measured by subjective probabilities, then JJ consistency 
demands that they satisfy the probability axiomsll (79). It imme­
diately follows that for your belief in h to be justified with respect 
to your system of beliefs, then it must satisfy the axioms of 
probability calculus with respect to your other beliefs. 
Consider an example concerning perception. Suppose I 
"know" the proposition d that there is a desk :in front of me. 
When asked how I know that d, I might say that it is supported 
by a variety of other beliefs like "I am fairly certain that my vision 
is reliable," "I am certain that tables have this shape," "I am 
confident that there was a table here a minute ago/' "I am 
somewhat certain that the table did not move." Given these 
other beliefs, one still might ask how these beliefs (if they them­
selves are justified) justify d. In response, I can show mathemati­
cally that d is the only consistent hypothesis given my other 
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beliefs and the axioms of Bayesianism. In other words, my 
knowledge that d is consistent with and justifiable by my set of 
other beliefs by the laws of Bayesianism. 
Having laid down the philosophic foundations of 
Bayesianism, we turn now to a specific kind of connection be­
tween beliefs: induction. 
The Bayesian Justification of Induction - Virtues and Vices 
Although Bayesianism claims to justify the connections 
between our beliefs, experiential induction seems to cause prob­
lems for the Bayesian picture. In the previous section, we saw 
how Bayesianism uses the Dutch Book to justify the connections 
between our beliefs. If Bayesianism truly justifies the connec­
tions between our beliefs, then it should be able to justify the 
connections between our belief in experience and conclusions we 
draw from that experience. In other words, Bayesianism should 
be able to justify induction. Nevertheless, while the Bayesian 
axioms provide a compelling account of experiential induction, 
they seem unable to refute the direct challenge of Hume's skepti­
cal argument. Our exploration of the Bayesian picture of induc­
tion begins with Bayes's Theorem. 
Bayes's Theorem provides a justified account of certain 
conditional probabilities. From the axioms of probability calcu­
lus, we can derive Bayes's Theorem: P(lt I e) = Pee I h)P(h) / P(e) , 
In plain English, "The probability of the hypothesis given the 
event is equal to the probability of the event given the hypothesis 
times the probability of the hypothesis over the probability of the 
event." An addendum to Bayes's Theorem, the subjective proba­
bility that e, P(e), has a useful equivalent expression based on the 
Total Probability Theorem. Given a subjective probability Pee) 
and a set of hypothesis hl' h21 h3 ...hI! that are mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive, the Total Probability Theorem states that the 
probability that Pee) =P(h1)P(e I hI) + P(hJP(e I hJ + ... + P(hJP(e 
I It). Most important, by using substitution of the Total Proba­
bility Theorem into Bayes's Theorem, we get an alternate, and 
ulLimately the most useful, construction of the Bayes's Theorem: 
P(h I e) == Pee I h) P(h) / sum( P(h,JP(e I h,J). 
From Bayes's Theorem, the Bayesian claims to have a rule 
for updating subjective probabilities based on experience­
Bayesian conditionalization. Suppose P(h) is your subjective 
probability before experiencing e and P'(h) is your subjective 
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probability after experiencing e. According to Bayesianism we 
should set P'(h) == POl I e). This stipulation seems natural 
enough; indeed, if P(h I e) is your subjective probability that h 
given the event e then it follov.s that after the event e occurs, you 
should set P'(IL) to POI I e) to be consistent. Interestingly, there is 
some debate over whether setting P'OI) = POI I e) is actually 
Dutch Book justified; however, for the purposes of this paper, we 
will assume this assignment is justified. In all, Bayes's rule 
clearly gives us a model for updating subjective probabilities 
based on eX'Perience-induction. 
For example, consider the belief that bread is nourishing. 
Consider three hypotheses: 
110: No bread is nourishing 

hso: 50% of bread is nourishing 

h1oo: All bread is nourishing 

Assume that these hypotheses are exhaustive of the hypotheses 
v:e are considering. Also, note that they are mutually exclusive. 
Before tasting any bread, we might favor one hypothesis over the 
other; in any case, our subjective probabilities for all three hy­
potheses need to add up to one because this is an exhaustive set 
of hypotheses. The issue of assigning subjective probabilities has 
been much debated in Bayesian literature; however, we will just 
assume indifference, assigning POI,,) = 1/3. According to Bayes's 
RuIe, as we begin to taste pieces of bread, our degrees of belief in 
each hypothesis shouId change in such a way that our beliefs are 
consistent and mirror our own process of inductive reasoning. 
Indeed, after the first taste of nourishing bread, el , our subjective 
probabilities change in a natural way: P'OzrJ = 0, P'OZ5rJ == 1/3, 
P'OZlOrJ = 2/3. As additional confirming experience is gathered, 
our inductive conclusion that all bread is nourishing continues to 
be justified by the Bayesian probability calcuIus. After four 
nourishing pieces of bread our subjective probability POzuxJ = 
16/17 is compared to POZ5J ::: 1/17. 
At first glance, Bayesianism accounts for our inductive 
reasoning in a realistic manner; moreover, it justifies this reason­
ing by showing that these inductive leaps create a consistent 
system of belief. Clearly, the example shows how confirming 
experience with bread bolsters our hypothesis"all bread is nour­
ishing." Indeed, where Hume believed we were unjustified in 
making assumptions based on experience, this Bayesian example 
shows that any belief system that doesn't respond to experience is 
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inherently inconsistent and unjustified (except, of course, when 
the initial probability P(h) is 0). 
Nevertheless, although the Bayesian seems to refute 
Hume's skeptical argument, the Bayesian model of induction 
fails to meet the exact skeptical challenge. In fact, the Bayesian 
system cannot prove that we are any more justified in believing 
some hypothesis will be true for all time than that a hypothesis 
will be true up until a certain date. To explore this possible 
Humean counter-example to the Bayesian argUment, we look at a 
similar example. 
Consider again the belief that bread is nourishing. We 
begin by considering the same three mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive hypotheses, plus a fourth: ht "Bread is nourishing up 
until June 1." After the first taste of nourishing bread before 
June, el , our subjective probabilities change as follows: P'(hoY = 0, 
P'(h5oY = 1/5, P'(hJ = 2/5, P'(hlOoY = 2/5. As additional confirming 
experience is gathered, P(hJ continues to equal P(h10oY. 
P(hlOoY changes by the same amount as P(hJ after each 
consecutive confirming experience. In the preceding example, 
the hypothesis"all bread is nourishing" and the hypothesis"all 
bread is nourishing until June" remained equally subjectively 
probable after each confirming experience. Certainly, if we set 
the priors differently, we could artificially avoid this equality. 
Nevertheless, even with different priors, P(lllOO) would still 
change by a similar amount as P(ht) after each consecutive con­
firming experience. As proof, after each experience we will 
always multiply both P(l1.lOoY and P(ht) by the same quantity, 
ljP(e). In other words, instead of the Bayesian theories' changing 
the values of P(hlOoY and P(hJ to support P(h100) and refute Hume, 
only the arbitrary value of the priors influences the outcome. 
Clearly, to refute Hume's skeptical argument, Bayesian­
ism needs to justify our being more inclined to believe P(hlOoY 
than P(llJ. Hume's skeptical argument claimed that we were no 
more justified in believing that a hypothesis will be true for all 
time than we are justified in believing that a hypothesis will be 
h'ue up until some date. However, in everyday experience we 
think the former hypothesis is much more justified. Thus, to 
refute Hume's skeptical argument Bayesianism needs to show 
that P(hl00Y is more justified than P(ht) after confirming evidence. 
Unfortunately for the Bayesian, the above example shows that 
Bayesianism does not provide this evidence and does not meet 
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the skeptical challenge. 
The Humean Counter-Example: A Larger Bayesian Problem 
Just like the Humean counter-example shows that 
Bayesianism cannot justify induction over time, we can make a 
counter-example against induction over other traits. Consider 
the hypothesis Iza that "all tennis balls are bouncy" and hb "all 
tennis balls except orange tennis balls are bouncy." We test 
tennis balls of all different shapes and sizes and they are all 
bouncy. In fact, just to be safe, we test tennis balls of over a 
thousand different colors. They too are bouncy. However, up 
until today we have not actually tested any orange tennis balls. 
Clearly, after testing tennis balls of a thousand different colors, 
we know that color has nothing to do with a tennis ball's bounce. 
As such, we would like to say that we know hb is false, or at least 
very subjectively improbable. More to the point, we would like 
to indu.ce that orange tennis balls are bouncy. Nevertheless, by 
Bayesian conditionalization, each hypothesis is equally proba­
ble-P(hJ = P(hJ. Just like in the Humean counter-example, 
Bayesianism does not justify induction. In light of this counter­
example, Bayesianism is clearly incapable of justifying a variety 
of different types of induction- the Humean counter-example is 
not a "special case." So how do these counter-examples work? 
In general, Humean-style counter-examples work by cre­
ating a hypothesis that accords with the inductive hypothesis 
except with respect to the inductive leap. In the tennis ball 
example, we attempt to make an inductive leap-that all tennis 
balls are bouncy, even though we have not tested orange tennis 
balls. The counter-example works by identifying this inductive 
leap and proposing a hypothesis that accords with this induction 
except with respect to orange tennis balls. As such, all evidence 
that supports the inductive hypothesis also supports the counter­
hypothesis, hb.: thus, the hypotheses are equally justified. The 
Humean counter-example works in the same way. The inductive 
leap is to assume that because bread is nourishing in the past, it 
will also be nourishing in the future. The counter-hypothesis 
accords with this inductive hypothesis, except with respect to the 
future. Once again, all available evidence equally supports both 
hypotheses; thus, Bayesianism fails to justify induction. In all, it 
seems that given almost any inductive hypothesis we can create 
a counter-hypothesis that exploits this inductive leap and shows 
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induction is unjustified. 
In fact, the way the Humean counter-examples work 
exposes a larger problem with the Bayesian system. In short, 
with respect to certain types of hypotheses Bayesianism acts 
more like a sophisticated process of elimination than a model of 
human inductive reasoning. To begin, we distinguish a certain 
type of hypothesis: "non-probabilistic hypotheses." Such a dis­
tinction between probabilistic and non-probabilistic hypotheses 
is a real, meaningful distinction - all hypotheses behaving in the 
manner described by their category. 
Pee I h), where 1z is a "non-probabilistic" hypothesis, can 
only equal either 1/ 0, or Pee) given any event e. The hypothesis 
h100 in the Humean counter-example is a good example of a 
non-probabilistic hypothesis. Given ew a nourishing piece of 
bread, peen I /twoJ will always be 1. Similarly, given ep' a non­
nourishing piece of bread, Peep I 1z 10oJ will always be O. Pee I hlOoJ 
= Pee) only in the case where e and h100 are probabilistically 
independent-they have nothing to do with each other. For 
example, if e; signifies 11 daisies growing in the garden," the 
conditional probability of P(el I hlOoJ = P(eJ. Clearly, by the 
axioms of probability Pee; I hlOoJ Pee; 1\ hl00J / P(JZ10oJ. Further, 
because when a and bare probabilistically independent, Pea 1\ b) 
= P(a)P(b), it follows that P(el I 1z100J = P(eJP(JIlOoJ/P(hlOoJ = P(eJ. 
Most importantly, lzlOo represents a non-probabilistic hypothesis 
because Pee I lz100J cannot equal anything besides 1, 0, or Pee) 
given any event e. More to the point, Pee I h100J can never equal .5 
or .3 unless, of course, e and h100 are probabilistically indepen­
dent. So how do non-probabilistic hypotheses behave in the 
Bayesian system? 
Given a set of mutually exclusive non-probabilistic hy­
potheses, one's subjective probabilities in these hypotheses can 
only (1) remain unchanged, (2)rise at a constant rate across all 
hypotheses, or (3) go to zero based on a single event. First, one's 
subject probabilities in a non-probabilistic hypothesis remain 
effectively unchanged when all events are probabilistically inde­
pendent of tlle hypothesis. In such a scenario, Pee I h) = Pee). 
When this result is applied to Bayesian conditionalization, P'(h) = 
P(ll). Second, one's subjective probabilities rise at a constant rate 
across all hypotheses when all events accord with the hypothe­
ses. For example, consider two non-probabilistic hypotheses: hr 
all red balls are bouncy and h. all balls are bouncy. Every time 
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we experience er, a red bouncy ball, P(er I hr) = P(e r I hJ = 1. 
Thus, our subjective probabilities of P(hr) and P(hJ rise at the 
same rate. Finally, one's subjective probabilities in a non­
probabilistic hypothesis can go to zero given a single event. In the 
case of h100, all bread is nourishing, eating just one piece of 
non-nourishing bread, epr fully eliminates this hypothesis. P(ep I 
hlOoJ = 0 so P'(hlocJ == o. 
The unfortunate implication of these observations is that, 
with respect to non-probabilistic hypotheses, Bayesianism be­
haves like a sophisticated process of elimination. Consider a set 
of non-probabilistic hypotheses (hI" .h lO) with equal prior proba­
bilities (P(h,J = 1/10). Inevitably I experience events that affect 
my subjective probabilities in these hypotheses. If the event is in 
accordance with some of my hypotheses h1•••h9, then I increment 
my subjective probability in these hypotheses equally across 
hI" .Ils. If the event is counter to a hypothesis h10l I eliminate the 
hypothesis and set P(hlJ = O. Observe that this is essentially a 
process of elimination. As events come in, I either eliminate a 
hypothesis, leave its subjective probability unchanged, or adjust 
the subjective probability equally to all others. Indeed, I can 
never encounter an affirming event that will cause my subjective 
probability of P(h1) and P(hJ to rise at different rates. Instead, P(h1) 
and P(hJ either rise at the same rate, or I eliminate a hypothesis. 
In a process of elimination, all hypotheses remain relatively 
equally attractive that have not been proven otherwise by the 
evidence at hand. Clearly, with respect to non-probabilistic 
hypotheses, Bayesianism behaves similarly to a process of elimi­
nation. • 
A system capable of induction needs to support subjective 
probabilities that can change at different rates given the same 
evidence. As shown above, for Bayesianism to justify induction, 
it needs to show that an inductive hypothesis is justifiably more 
subjectively probable than the counter-inductive hypothesis. For 
instance, in the Humean counter-example, to justify induction, 
Bayesiarusm needs to show that P01J < POZlOJ given the same 
evidence and the same priors. Truly, any system capable of 
supporting induction needs to support subjective probabilities 
growing at different rates given the same evidence. 
Because a process of elimination does not support subjec­
tive probabilities changing at different rates given the same 
evidence, it seems that Bayesianism is inherently unqualified to 
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justify induction of non-probabilistic hypotheses. As shown 
above, the Bayesian system operates like a sophisticated process 
of elimination with respect to non-probabilistic hypotheses. As 
such, Bayesian conditionalization will always grow subjective 
probabilities at the same rate, except to fully eliminate a hypothe­
sis. Nonetheless, an inductive system needs to grow subjective 
probabilities at different rates - exactly what Bayesianism, as a 
process of elimination, can't do. In alt this deep relation between 
Bayesian conditionalization of non-probabilistic hypotheses and 
a process of elimination lies at the heart of Bayesianism's inability 
to justify induction. 
One might object that even if the Bayesian handling of 
non-probabilistic hypotheses is inherently unqualified to handle 
induction, the Bayesian handling of probabilistic hypotheses 
does not suffer from the same problem. We defined non­
probabilistic hypotheses as those hypotheses that when consid­
ered as condition probability Pee I h) returned 1,0, or Pee) for any 
e. However, probabilistic hypotheses like "50% of bread is nour­
ishing" or "only two pieces of bread are nourishing" can yield Pee 
I 11.) = [0..1]. In other words, probabilistic hypotheses can change 
at different rates given the same evidence. As such, it seems that 
tlle Bayesian handling of probabilistic hypotheses might not be 
so "inherently unqualified" to handle induction. 
Although Bayesianism certainly does not act like a pro­
cess of elimination with respect to probabilistic hypotheses, 
Bayesianism is still unsuited to justify induction of probabilistic 
hypotheses. Observe that probabilistic inductive hypotheses like 
hso' "50% of bread is nourishing," all have an inductive leap. For 
1150, the leap is the assumption that because 50% of bread was 
nourishing in the past it will continue to be so in the future. 
Dsing the same method described above, we can formulate a 
hypothesis that exploits this inductive leap - h" 50% of bread will 
be nourishing until tomorrow when no bread will be nourishing. 
Once again, the subjective probabilities of the two hypotheses 
change at the same rate given the same evidence. In all, certainly 
the subjective probabilities of probabilistic hypotheses do not 
necessarily change at the same rate given the same evidence (like 
they do with non-probabilistic hypotheses); nevertheless, we can 
still construct two hypotheses that do, in fact, change at the same 
rate given the same evidence up to a point. Thus, even proba­
bilistic hypotheses are subject to Humean counter-examples to 
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induction, though not for entirely the same reasons. 
One might also object that non-probabilistic hypotheses 
can, in fact, be construed to change at different rates. Certainly, 
when e signifies eating a nourishing piece of bread pee I hl0d 
because given that all bread is nourishing, it follows that every 
experience of eating bread will be nourishing. Similarly, pee I hJ 
also equals one because assuming it is before June all bread must 
be nourishing. However, perhaps we can interpret P(e I hJ such 
that it does not equal one. If we consider e not as IIeating 
nourishing bread right now" but as IIeating nourishing bread in 
general" then pee I ht) is certainly less than 1. Consider that hI 
means that only the bread before June will be nourishing. Fur­
ther, I will experience eating bread both before and after June. 
Thus, "the probability that bread will be nourishing given the 
hypothesis" might be interpreted as "the probability that my 
experience of eating bread will be before June." Given that I will 
have experiences of eating bread before and after June (in fact, 
my next experience might be after June), this probability will 
certainly be less than 1. Most importantly, if P(e I hJ < 1 then 
P(hJ and P(7!lOoJ change at different rates - supporting induction. 
Nevertheless, whether or not this interpretation of P(e I 
hJ makes sense, the inconsistencies this interpretation raises in 
the overall Bayesian system show that P(e I hi) cannot be less 
than one. If we consistently interpret e as 1/ the general experience 
of eating bread," we are bound to have inconsistent beliefs. 
Suppose we eat a piece of non-nourishing bread before June. 
With this interpretation of e as a general experience, we are 
committed to believing that hi even though hI is definitely false. 
In short, such an interpretation inevitably leads us to a situation 
where we have a P(71J that is above 0 even though we have eaten 
non-nourishing bread before June. 
In concluding, certainly Bayesian conditionalization pro­
vides a compelling story of how our beliefs can be justified given 
certain relevant experiences. Nevertheless, because Bayesian 
conditionalization of non-probabilistic hypotheses behaves like a 
process of elimination, it is inherently unqualified to justify 
inductive logic. In all, by identifying the deep Bayesian problems 
that give Humean counter-examples their force, we have defined 
more precisely the task ahead for the defender of justified induc­
tion. 
Stanford Universittj 
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